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Abstract
Rowan Williams once asserted that "all that can be said by the Christian about justice rests
on a doctrine of God." This article uses Williams' argument in support of that statement as a
vehicle for examining the challenges facing those who would construct explicitly theological
accounts of law as well as the potential contributions of theologically informed legal scholarship.
An important focus of the article is on theological particularity.
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Ultimately, all that can be said by the Christian about justice rests on a doctrine of God, not
simply as the God whose truthful love is directed towards us, but as the God whose very life is
"justice," in the sense that Father, Son and Holy Spirit reflect back to each other perfectly and
fully the reality that each one is, "give glory" to each other.

These words, spoken by then-Bishop Rowan Williams to a gathering of Welsh and
English judges and lawyers, rest on the assumption that faith has something to say not
2
only about the virtue of justice, but also about the practice of law. Crudely summarized,
1. Rowan Williams, "Administering Justice: For the Wales and Chester Judges' Circuit" in Open
to Judgement: Sermons and Addresses (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1994), pp. 24346. Further references to Williams' essay will be made parenthetically within the text, and
abbreviated AJ.
2. Although the occasion of the address itself establishes this point, Williams goes on to say
explicitly; "Good judgement (good judgements) weaves together the drawing of connections
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Williams' argument goes something like this: (1) Here is what God is like: (a) God is
triune: Father, Son and Holy Spirit, in Himself a being in perfect communion "in the
sense that Father, Son and Holy Spirit reflect back to each other perfectly and fully the
reality that each one is, 'give glory' to each other." (b) God gives human beings His loving attention. (2) When we contemplate this God, "we know ourselves to be the object of
a costly and careful attention, searching out the whole of our truth, accepting it and
engaging with it; we experience the way that grace opens our eyes to what we'd rather
not face in ourselves, gently brings us back to confront our failures honestly, gathers up
what's fragmented and forgotten." (3) This contemplation helps us understand what it
means to bear God's image and so to do justice to each other - to give to each what is his
due, which turns out to be "truth sustained by grace." (AJ, p. 244)
The surprising take-away from Williams' address is that "the vision of God is the
cornerstone of justice" (AJ, p. 243): "[a] society that doesn't understand contemplation
[of God] won't understand justice because it will have forgotten how to look selflessly at
what is other" but "will take refuge in generalities, prejudices, self-serving clich6s." (AJ,
p. 244) Indeed, says Williams, "[t]he administration of justice - as [the last] century
frighteningly shows - becomes harder and harder, the more we cease to take it for granted
that God is to be honored." (AJ, p. 245)
My aim is neither to quarrel with what is, by my lights, an attractive conception of
justice nor to take potshots at the incompleteness of what was, after all, an occasional
address.3 Williams is right that "when we give up the struggle to show to someone else
as fully and adequately as possible what their reality is, we become barbarous" and even,
more controversially, that "that struggle can only keep going if we are confident that
there is a depth and a reality to persons because they are the objects of an eternal attention that has in it not selfishness, fiction or illusion." (AJ, p. 244) That said, in addressing
a group of lawyers and judges as an Anglican priest, Williams' aim was presumably not
merely to present an attractive conception of justice, but to instruct them in the truth - to
"really" connect the requirements of justice with the God he and other Christians worship, even though the connection be admittedly drawn by a fallen, fallible (which is to
say, human) teacher.
and analogies with the recognition of obstinate particularity as it appears here and now; and
in this demanding art, it gives, in its own way, to God what belongs to God, by giving God's
images the attention they claim, some little reflection of the attention of God." (AJ, p. 246)
3. Although the address is brief, it is characteristic of Williams' thought more generally. Mike
Higton argues that "in the two or more million words of his published writings [Williams] is
constantly concerned to press one simple question . . .[:] What difference would it [make] if I
believed myself subject to a gaze which saw all my surface accidents and arrangements, all my
inner habits and inheritances, all my anxieties and arrogances, all my history - and yet a gaze
which nevertheless loved that whole tangled bundle which makes me the self I am, with an
utterly free, selfless, love?" Mike Higton, Difficult Gospel: The Theology of Rowan Williams
(London: SCM Press, 2004), pp. 1-2. The essay bears at least two other characteristic marks
of Williams' thought as well - an insistence on responding in openness to others, id. at 19,
112-18, and a refusal to disconnect theological knowledge from worship, id. at 34, 48. For
more on Williams' thought generally, see also Rupert Shortt, Rowan Williams: An Introduction
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2003).
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It is not only Williams and, indeed, not only bishops, who are seeking to connect justice with God. Nor is it only Bible-thumping preachers and opportunistic politicians.
Increasingly, law professors are doing so, and not just at schools commonly regarded as
academic backwaters. One can find recent contributions to Christian legal theory from
legal academics at Harvard, Penn and Yale, not to mention Notre Dame and Emory.4 The
aim of this article is to examine Williams' claim to connect God, justice and law in order
to exhibit some of the difficulties and some of the promise that attend efforts to connect
Christian theology and law more generally.

I. Situating Williams' Doctrine of God
As we have seen, Williams rests his claims about what law should be squarely on his
account of who God is and what He is like. Although he does not say so explicitly,
Williams assumes that theology is important for ethics because we cannot know what we
should do apart from understanding the situation in which we find ourselves. 5 Making
good judgments requires knowing not only the consequences that will attend our choices,
but also who God is and who we are in relation to Him and to each other.
This assumption raises an obvious challenge to the project of developing theological
accounts of law. If good choices depend on a truthful understanding of the world in general (and perhaps even the world to come), 6 religious accounts of law are arguably divisive "conversation stoppers" 7 inaccessible in principle to nonbelieving citizens and
therefore inimical to some conceptions of democracy. The argument as to whether theological perspectives are any more particular than other "thick" perspectives that underwrite political discourse,8 and thus whether such perspectives are appropriate to public
discourse in a democracy, is beyond the scope of a short article. 9 I will consider only the

4. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., "The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship,"
Emory Law Journal57 (2008), p. 147; William J. Stuntz, "Christian Legal Theory," Harvard
Law Review 116 (2003), p. 1707; Michael W. McConnell, Robert F Cochran, Jr., and Angela
C. Carmella, eds., Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001); John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, Christianityand Law: An Introduction

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
5. Stanley Hauerwas, "On doctrine and ethics" in Colin Gunton, ed., The CambridgeCompanion to
ChristianDoctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 33 (characterizing Karl
Barth's ethics). I am indebted to Prof. Hauerwas's essay for introducing me to Williams' address.
6. This claim is easily pressed too far. Most Christians would affirm that holding true religious
beliefs is not necessary for many, if not most, common moral or legal decisions. See Robert
F Cochran, Jr., "Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court Justices: A Theological Analysis,"
University of St. Thomas Law Journal4 (2006), pp. 299-304.

7. Richard Rorty, "Religion as a Conversation-Stopper", in Philosophy and Social Hope (New
York: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 171.
8. See, e.g., Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI:

Eerdmans, 2nd ed., 1984).
9. For further discussion, see generally Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular
Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Christopher J. Eberle, Religious
Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michael
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ways in which Williams' account of God and justice is contestable even from a perspective internal to Christianity, and the consequences of that fact for the development of
Christian accounts of law.
The formulations about God that command the most widespread assent among
Christians are to be found in the creeds. The Apostles' Creed, for example, identifies God
as triune: "God the Father ...
Jesus Christ, His only Son . . . [and] the Holy Spirit."
Moreover, God the Father is affirmed to be "almighty" and the "creator of the heavens
and earth." Jesus is not merely God's "only Son" but also "our Lord" and the one who in
his earthly life was "born of the Virgin Mary; suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried" and "was raised from the dead." 10
There are, however, many additional questions humans have wanted to ask about God,
some of which relate to philosophical questions that were being asked long before the birth
of Christ. Giving a systematic account of who God is and what He is like that responds to
these questions has, not surprisingly, posed a formidable task for Christian theologians
over the centuries. Consider, for example, three important debates related to the Christian
doctrine of God. The first concerns the relation between God's being and His actions." We
may see what God is like as, for example, He leads Israel out of Egypt in the Exodus - that
is, we may know Him to some extent in His actions, but theologians, including Williams, 1 2
have had profound hesitation about saying that we know God "as He really is in Himself." 1 3
A second debate concerns the words and concepts we use when we speak about God.
Originating, as they do, in our experience of the created world, how can we be sure that
they can be predicated meaningfully about God, who is beyond anything with which we
are familiar? 14 Three of the most familiar attempts to deal with this problem are the way
of negation, the way of eminence and the way of causality.15 In the first of these
approaches, we attribute characteristics to God by beginning with our own experience of
creaturely limitation and denying that God is subject to such limitations, enabling us to
say what God is not (e.g., limited by space and time), even if we are unable fully to say
what He is. 1 6 In the alternative, we may (following the way of eminence), begin with
admirable qualities we observe in creation and say that God possesses these qualities to
J. Perry, Under God?: Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2003).
10. "The Apostles Creed" in Alister E. McGrath, ed., The Christian Theology Reader (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995), p. 8.
11. See Colin E. Gunton, Act and Being (London: SCM Press, 2002), pp. 9-12, 21-23.
12. See, e.g., Rowan Williams, "A Ray of Darkness" in Open to Judgement: Sermons and
Addresses (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1994), pp. 118-124.
13. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the Dominican Province (New York:
Benziger Brothers, 1948) Ja.13.2, ad 3; see also Gunton, Act and Being, pp. 49-54.
14. For a statement of the problem, see Brian Davies, An Introductionto the Philosophyof Religion

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1993), pp. 20-31.
15. Gunton, Act and Being, p. 12. See also F.D.E. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans.
H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 197-200;
Etienne Gilson, The ChristianPhilosophyof Thomas Aquinas, trans. L.K. Shook (Notre Dame,

IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp.97-110.
16. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), Bk. 1, ch. 14.
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an unlimited degree.17 Or, finally, because admirable qualities must be generated by a
prior higher cause, we may attribute to the higher cause a transcendent version of the
quality that is analogous (but not identical) to the observable lower quality.
A third debate concerns whether abstract philosophical concerns have exerted too much
influence over Christian doctrines of God. If God has revealed himself in Christ, in history
and in the Bible, should not his self-disclosure provide the primary categories of thought,
rather than being subservient to the potentially alien categories of (Greek) philosophy? 19
Even with only this rough sketch of a few of the many controversies surrounding the
doctrine of God, we can begin to situate Williams' account of God theologically. It draws
both on God's "internal" being and on his actions in history. God is triune - in His inner
being, He is Trinity. In His external acts, He is, among other things, One who gives
human beings "costly and careful attention." Williams' account falls mostly on the biblical side of the philosophical/biblical divide noted above. The focus is not on the absence
of limitations on God's being, nor on the superiority of His perfections compared to ours,
nor on the relation higher causes must have to the things they produce. Instead, the focus
is on God in three Persons, and the way the Three relate to each other. However optimistic individual Christian theologians may have been over the prospect of natural theology,
even the most optimistic have held that human beings could not know of the Trinity apart
20
from divine revelation, much less have reason to believe that the inner life of God consists of "reflect[ing] back to each other perfectly and fully the reality that each one is,
'giv[ing] glory' to each other." Moreover, Williams' account of the mixture of judgment,
mercy and truth-telling is, in theological terms, Christological - emphasizing Jesus'
212
incarnation as a revelation of what God is like21 and his costly sacrifice for human sin.2 2
Even among those employing a more "biblical" than "philosophical" approach to the
doctrine of God, however, Williams might still have some explaining to do. If we recur
to God's actions in history as presented in Scripture, and especially those related to
God's justice, we might conclude that the thought of "know[ing] ourselves to be the
object of a costly and careful attention, searching out the whole of our truth" may not
always be as welcome a prospect as Williams seems to suggest. To take but one famous
example, when the prophet Isaiah is commissioned, he has a vision in which he is in the
presence of God seated on a throne surrounded by angels declaring the holiness and
23
glory of God. Isaiah has not, as yet, received any attention from God, but can only

17. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la.4.2.
18. See ibid., la.4.2.
19. Gunton, Act and Being, pp. 19-23. The question is finally one of relative emphasis. See Gerald
Bray, The Doctrine of God (Downers Grove, EL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), pp. 28-35.
20. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la.32. 1.
21. John 1:18 ("No one has ever seen God; the only God, who is at the Father's side, he has made
him known."). All Scripture quotations in this article are taken from the English Standard
Version.
22. There are also philosophical underpinnings for Williams' convictions about the importance
of giving careful attention to the other. See Shortt, Rowan Williams, pp. 76-80 (discussing
Williams' indebtedness to Hegel).
23. Isaiah, spurred by the vision of God, judges himself. Shortly thereafter, God sends an angel
with a burning coal to purify his lips and atone for his guilt. See Isaiah 6:6.
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declare: "Woe to me! . . I am ruined! For I am a man of unclean lips, and I live among
a people of unclean lips, and my eyes have seen the King, the LORD Almighty."24 If
Isaiah's experience is any guide, the vision of God that Williams is encouraging the lawyers to pursue seems a good bit more unsettling than Williams lets on.
Isaiah is not the only example. The psalmist describes God as one who "hate[s] all
evildoers," one with whom "evil may not dwell," one who "destroy[s] those who speak
lies" and "abhors the bloodthirsty and deceitful man."2 5 God's "face ... is against those
who do evil, to cut off the memory of them from the earth."2 6 This is apparently not merely
a matter of words. We see plagues visited on the oppressive Egyptians2 7 and the grumbling
Israelites,28 the ground swallowing up the rebellious "sons of Korah," 2 9 not to mention the
lengthening of Israel's wandering in the wilderness 3 0 and the commanded slaughter of the
Amalekites in retribution for their prior attack on vulnerable Israel. 3 1 The prophet Nahum
pronounces judgment on Nineveh for its violence and materialism3 2 in frightening terms:
God not only "takes vengeance on his foes and maintains his wrath against his enemies,"
but his anger is "fierce" and his "wrath is poured out like fire." 3 3 "The mountains quake
before him and the hills melt away;" who, then, "can withstand his indignation?" 34
Even Jesus refers to God's justice and wrath on more than one occasion, comparing his
second coming to Noah's flood,35 admonishing the disciples not to "fear those who kill
the body, and after that have nothing more that they can do," but rather to "fear him who,
after he has killed, has authority to cast into hell." 3 6 He offers a surprising answer to those
who told him about Pilate's murder of Galileans who were in the midst of offering sacrifices: "Do you think that these Galileans were worse sinners than all the other Galileans,
because they suffered in this way? No, I tell you; but unless you repent, you will all likewise perish."3 7 As for those who failed to feed the hungry, attend to the thirsty and the
naked and look after the prisoners, Jesus says they will be sentenced to "[d]epart from
him . . . into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels." 38 He announces that
"whoever rejects the Son will not see life, for God's wrath remains on him." 3 9 And Jesus
40
himself is angry on at least three occasions - He is explicitly stated to have been angry
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Isaiah 6:5.
Ps 5:4.
Ps 34:16.
Exodus 7-11.
Numbers 21:4-9.
Numbers 16.
Numbers 14:30-35.
1 Sam. 15:2-3.
See Nahum 2:12; 3:16.
Nahum 1:2,6.
Nahum 1:5,6.
Matt. 24:37-38.
Luke 12:4-5.
Luke 13:2-3.
Matt. 25:41.
John 3:36.

40. R.V.G. Tasker, The Biblical Doctrine of the Wrath of God (London: Tyndale Press, 1951), pp.

30-35.
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with the Pharisees who were attempting to use his Sabbath healing of a man with a withered hand against him;41 he was "indignant" with his disciples for refusing to bring little
children to him,4 2 and demonstrated his displeasure in the cleansing of the temple.4 3
At this point Williams would surely (and rightly) object that it is misleading to offer
an account of God's justice offered in abstraction from other aspects of his character,
especially his mercy.44 Indeed, in many biblical passages, God's mercy and his justice
are held alongside each other. Consider, for example, God's famous self-description
when he reveals himself to Moses as Moses appears before him with the second set of
stone tablets:
The LORD descended in the cloud and stood with [Moses] there, and proclaimed the name of
the LORD. The LORD passed before him and proclaimed, "The LORD, the LORD, a God
merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, keeping
steadfast love for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, but who will by no
means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children and the children's
children, to the third and the fourth generation."45
In some of the other passages, too, God's mercy is plainly visible alongside his judgment. After Isaiah's cry of woe mentioned earlier, an angel touches his lips with a hot
coal and declares his guilt "taken away" and his "sin atoned for." 4 6 When the grumbling
Israelites repent after the plague of snakes is sent, God instructs Moses to make a bronze
snake and put it on a pole. Thereafter, "when anyone was bitten by a snake and looked at
the bronze snake, he lived." 47 In many other passages as well, God threatens judgment
that will be abated if Israel repents.4 8
Even recognizing that God's justice is not his only characteristic, there is something
deeply mysterious about these passages. How can God "forgiv[e] iniquity and transgression and sin" without "clear[ing] the guilty"? To use the language of the New Testament,
if "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God," how can God be both "just and [at
the same time] the justifier of the [sinner] who has faith in Jesus"? 49 How could a just God
41. Mark 3:5.
42. Mark 10:13.
43. John 2:13-16. Tasker also suggests other instances of Jesus's anger from the parables and his
denunciation of human pride. See Tasker, Biblical Doctrine of the Wrath of God, pp. 29-30;

33-35.
44. Indeed, Williams elsewhere addresses this very point:
All this really comes to one thing: the terrible threat of knowledge without love. Is anything in
human relations more frightening than that? And how often has the Christian picture of God
concentrated on His knowledge in a way that is totally oppressive? . . And our fear of exposing ourselves to any other - in therapy, in the confessional, or simply in ordinary friendship
- has a lot to do with that primitive dread of knowledge without love.
"Knowledge and Love," in Open to Judgement, p. 14.
45. Exodus 34:5-7.
46. Is. 6:6-7.
47. Numbers 21:9.
48. For a survey, see 0. Palmer Robertson, The Christ of the Prophets (Philipsburg, NJ: P&R
Publishing, 2004), pp. 184-87.
49. Romans 3:23, 26.
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simply write off the offenses of human beings against himself and against each other?
Where, in such an account, is justice for the offended and oppressed? For Christians, the
strange5 0 answer to this question is found in the cross of Christ, which unites God's justice
and his mercy through the sacrifice of the innocent (Judge!) for the guilty.

II. The Problem of Particularity
There are other points of theological particularity one might identify in Williams' brief
account of God and its application to the question of justice. Even with these few, albeit
important, points of division on the table, however, we can begin to see some of the challenges facing attempts to construct Christian theologies of law. Suppose we conclude
that, notwithstanding the prospect of God's wrath shown in the Bible, Williams is, finally,
justified in saying that when human beings contemplate God, "we know ourselves to be
the object of a costly and careful attention, searching out the whole of our truth, accepting it and engaging with it; we experience the way that grace opens our eyes to what
we'd rather not face in ourselves, gently brings us back to confront our failures honestly,
gathers up what's fragmented and forgotten." (AJ, p. 244) There is nevertheless an additional step to be made in Williams' account of justice. Williams proposes that God's
justice, and the Christian's experience of it, be the model for human justice. Can we
move so effortlessly from what God is like to what we should do?
Williams accomplishes this move by starting with the classical conception of justice
as "giving to each his due," but thereby raises another ground of controversy. In order to
make God's actions a model for human action, Williams invokes a constellation of ideas
- a classical definition of justice, a doctrine of God, and an assumption that it is appropriate to invoke (either univocally or analogically) the same definition of justice for the
interrelationships within the Godhead, for divine-human relationships and for relationships among human beings.

50. Emil Brunner invokes Luther's contrast between God's "proper work" of love and grace and
God's "strange work" of judgment on sin:
Indeed, the Cross of Jesus Christ itself, as a death of this kind, as a result of the wrath of God,
when we look at this aspect of the "slaying" of the Son of God, is a "strange work" of God,
while on the other hand, where it attains its end, in the repentance and faith of the sinner, it is
in very deed the most characteristic work of the Grace of God.
Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1950), p. 169 (internal citations omitted).
51. In doing so, he acknowledges that he is following Augustine who spoke of 'doing justice' to
God" by giving God His due (AJ, p. 243), and who held that "the less the soul is occupied with
the contemplation of God, the less it is subordinated to God; and the more the desires of the
flesh lust against the spirit, the less subordinate is the body to the soul," Augustine, The City
of God against the Pagans, trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Bk.
xix, ch. 4. For Augustine, "justice is found where the one supreme God rules an obedient City
according to His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him; and where, in consequence, the
soul rules the body in all men who belong to that City and obey God, and the reason faithfully
rules the vices in lawful order. In that City, both the individual just man and the community
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Theological theories of law will often, and perhaps always, involve similar and potentially contestable constellations of ideas. Which sets of theological doctrines are to be
foregrounded and which backgrounded? Suppose we take the constellation of doctrines
Williams uses and substitute a doctrine of the human person for the doctrine of God.5 2
Christian teaching emphasizes, among other things, that human beings are finite, fallen
and made in the image of God.53 The idea that human beings are God's image-bearers is
often invoked as a ground of their inherent dignity and is entirely consonant, in that
sense, with Williams' account. Human finitude and fallenness, on the other hand, might
well counsel against either the possibility or the desirability of Williams' aspirations for
justice. Human beings are presumably not capable of an attention that "search[es] out the
whole of our truth," nor is it obvious that we would want sinful human beings engaged
in such a potentially totalitarian enterprise.54
One can also anticipate the objection that Williams' treatment of the question of
justice is more indebted to theological categories than the biblical text itself. Even
though, as noted earlier, Williams' account of God is generally on the "biblical" side
of our posited biblical/philosophical divide, it is striking that to read a Christian theological essay about the relationship between divine and human justice, even an occasional lecture, that makes mention neither of Paul's classic discussion of human justice
in Romans 13 nor of other biblical passages more directly connected with civil
*
55
justice.
Paul's letter to the Romans describes governing authorities as "servant[s] of God,
avenger[s] who carr[y] out God's wrath on the wrongdoer." 5 6 While this passage as a

52.

53.
54.

55.

56.

and people of the just live by faith, which works by love: by that love with which a man loves
God as God ought to be loved, and his neighbour as himself." Ibid., Bk. xix, ch. 23.
For an introduction to the Christian doctrine of humanity, see Kevin Vanhoozer, "Human
being, individual and social" in Colin E. Gunton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Christian
Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-88.
Ibid., pp. 163-71.
Although God can "condemn and redeem at once," see Oliver O'Donovan, The Ways of
Judgment (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), p. 87, we cannot. O'Donovan argues that "[i]
dealist political orders have become tyrannous by ignoring this limitation, and pretending to
redeem when in fact they are doing no more than condemning. The practice of punishment
has never been in more danger of becoming cruel than when it is most confidently believed to
regenerate the offender and renew society." Ibid.
For a recent survey of Old and New Testament passages dealing with justice, see Nicholas
Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.
65-95, 109-31. Williams' approach may have had less to do with the constraints of a short
essay than with an intentional approach to theological ethics. Rather than "deriv[ing] moral
decisions straight from the Bible," many theological ethicists use "Scripture [to] norm[] theology, which develops a theological ethic." Craig G. Bartholomew, "Introduction" in Craig
Bartholomew, Jonathan Chaplin, Robert Song, Al Wolters, eds., A Royal Priesthood? The
Use of the Bible Ethically and Politically (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), p. 13.
Bartholomew also surveys several alternative approaches. Ibid., pp. 12-19.
Romans 13:5.
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whole has been a major battleground for interpreters of the New Testament, 57 bridging
the gap between Williams' emphasis on due regard for the offender and Paul's description of civil authorities as avengers of evil would seem to require at least a little explanation. For present purposes, it is enough to add to our catalogue of challenges facing
Christian accounts of law the inevitability of recourse to authoritative texts in theological
discussion. This raises the familiar challenge of interpretive issues related to both the
meanings of the texts themselves and their appropriate application.
Before we proceed to the promise inherent in Williams' account, and by extension in
theologically informed scholarship, a final difficulty must be noted. Even if one were to
agree in principle with Williams' account of what justice entails, it is not only dramatically underdetermined, but there seems to be little hope that more theologizing could add
sufficient detail to it that it might be put into operation in a real-world judicial system.

Ill. The Promise of Particularity
Our examination of Williams' account of justice not only reveals its contestability even
within Christian circles, but also strongly suggests that almost any argument attempting
to connect theology with law would be just as particular and therefore contestable as the
one Williams offers, again, even from within a Christian perspective. What, then, might
be the point of using Christianity as a lens through which to interrogate law?
The preceding discussion suggests that the point cannot be to prescribe the form and
substance of human political and legal institutions everywhere or to invest concrete political programs with divine authority. Notwithstanding the rhetorical uses to which "Christian
principles" have been put, Christian political thought has not traditionally endorsed a single set of institutions as best everywhere and for all time.58 The usual view has been that
most of the appropriate features of political and legal institutions, and the bulk of the content of the laws, are matters that must be judged in light of prevailing circumstances. What
benefit, then, might be gained from Christian reflection on law and justice?
If theology cannot generate unassailable legal concepts and prescribe the form of
concrete institutions once and for all, it may nevertheless help us to be critical of the ones
we have. For the Christian, common conceptions of retribution and justice may need to
be chastened by God's revelation in Christ. Karl Barth, for example, argues that if the
Christian fails to allow God's enacted justice to shape her understanding of the justice of
God, she runs the risk of creating a god after her own image:
It is not that we recognise and acknowledge the infinity, justice, wisdom, etc. of God because we
already know from other sources what all this means and we apply it to God in an eminent sense,
thus fashioning for ourselves an image of God after the patterns of our image in the world, i.e., in
the last analysis after our own image.... There are not first of all power, goodness, knowledge,

57. See Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 806-10
(surveying seven different readings of the passage on the question of the duty to submit to
governmental authority).
58. See Robert P. Kraynak, ChristianFaith and Modern Democracy (Notre Dame, IN: University

of Notre Dame Press, 2001), pp. 1-3.

8rewbaker

23

will, etc., in general, and then in particular God also as one of the subjects to whom all these things
accrue as a predicate. But everything that God is, and that is in God, is - as the origin of all that is
59
distinct from God and that can be the predicate of other subjects too - first and properly in Him.

So, for Barth, it cannot be that God's mercy and justice are opposed to each other. It must
rather be the case that God's justice is merciful and his mercy just. Following Williams'
line of thought we might add that our earthly conceptions of justice will likewise suffer
to the extent they are not grounded in divine justice. And if God's justice is merciful, and
his mercy just, then justice worthy of the name must be, in some sense, merciful and
mercy just.60 This would seem to call, at a minimum, for a system of human justice that
seeks the good of the offender and makes allowances for the human condition - the
bondage of the human will to sin - while still naming good as good, and evil as evil.
Offenders commit genuine offenses but are always neighbors to be loved.6 1
These insights, however, are not always easily extended into the public realm. Systems
of human justice, with good reason, typically present a stark choice between condemnation and exoneration, and thus tend to re-enact the tension between justice and mercy at
62
the heart of Christian theology. There does not seem to be room in our systems of earthly
justice for imitating in any direct way God's solution to the problem of human injustice.
Our government lacks the divine Legislator who might provide us with perfect earthly
laws. It lacks a sinless judge to serve as the sacrificial lamb for the criminal's offenses.
Much less can it call upon a Holy Spirit to help the offender "walk in newness of life." 63
59. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans., T.H.L. Parker, W.B. Johnston, Harold Knight, J.L.M.
Haire (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1957), vol. 11-1, pp. 333-34.
60. Barth argues that "the mercy of God lies in His readiness to share in sympathy the distress of
another." Ibid., p. 369. This mercy has, in part, the effect of mitigating the full demands of
God's wrath against sin: "That God who is provoked to anger is not only angry, but for the
sake of that which provokes him sets bounds to His anger and is compassionate, and that this
compassion is His and is therefore active, where His wrath slays, to make alive and renew
and enlighten - that is the secret and at the same time the simple and manifest reality of His
mercy." p. 373. Nevertheless, God's mercy must not be seen as undermining God's "victorious opposition to the resistance set up by the creature to God [i.e., sin]." p. 371. Rather, "the
mercy of God, too, expresses this opposition." Barth's point is not simply that God's opposition to sin is merciful in the sense that sin generates bad consequences, including punishment
and judgment, but that sin itself (not merely the consequences) is "distress and suffering and
misery[] Arrogance is seen as pitiable folly, the usurpation of freedom as rigorous bondage,
evil lust as bitter torment." p. 371. The sight of such misery moves God to action.
61. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Christian Love and Criminal Punishment" in Witte and Alexander,
eds., Christianityand Law: An Introduction,pp. 219-35.
62. But see O'Donovan, The Ways of Judgment, p. 87 ("Our judgments form a kind of reverse
image of God's judgment in Christ. Where he expounded the discrimination between sin and
righteousness concretely in the risen life of the man he accepted, we expound our discrimination concretely only by describing the offenses we reject. We cannot give concrete and effective approval, as we can give concrete and effective condemnation.").
63. Romans 6:4. Cf., O'Donovan, The Ways of Judgment, p. 87 ("The human judge may show the
Holy Spirit's help in judging, but cannot shed the Holy Spirit abroad on those who are judged.
Human judgment cannot assure mankind regeneration and new life.").
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The effort to assimilate the tension between justice and mercy in Christian thought
has nevertheless manifested itself in a number of lesser ways. Sometimes it has been
proposed that reconciling the tension requires choosing one over the other. So, for example, it has been argued (rarely) that in light of God's mercy in Christ, all earthly justice
should be suspended,6 4 or, on the other hand, that while life in the church requires that
the gospel law of forgiveness be followed, earthly life requires political judgments that
are "Mosaic and not evangelical."6 5 More commonly, Christian thought has carried on
earthly justice out of necessity, leaving it in uncomfortable tension with the implications
of the radical mercy shown the believer, so that force is restricted to the minimum necessary to achieve the society's protection.6 6
Another response to theology's limited usefulness in generating stand-alone concepts
of justice and mercy for use in law and politics has been to allow the Christian story to
chasten our expectations about earthly systems of justice. Some Christians have thus
made a pointed division between earthly politics and the reign of God, suggesting that
we would do well not to get our eschatological horizons confused, lest we create an
overly intrusive political order with unattainable aspirations. How much chastening is
67
thought appropriate has varied by time and place, but awareness of human fallenness
and limitation has almost always colored Christian political thought, both in the direction
of acknowledging the need for state punishment of wrongdoing and also in the direction
of acknowledging the limitations human officials face in meting out justice.
One of the most striking features of Williams' account of justice is the degree to which
it is shaped by narrative. It emphasizes both God's "inner nature" and his actions in history, but, as already noted, its accent is more biblical than philosophical: The most
important characteristic of God "in himself' is the mutual regard of the persons of the
Trinity for each other. The most salient feature of the divine/human relationship is the
"costly and careful attention" human beings receive from God. As we see God "speak[]
the truth in love"68 to us, we extend similar treatment to others.
Williams' account, then, is not merely, or perhaps even mainly, analytical. While the
essay provides an account of justice, the focus is less on clarifying legal concepts than to
call the assembled lawyers' and judges' attention to the ways in which they carry out
their work. Christian teaching about the universality of sin and the gift of grace and forgiveness are expected to affect not only reigning conceptions of justice, but also its practice. The Christian's own experience of God's justice and mercy in the context of human
sin should - though sadly and precisely because of that sin often does not - affect the
way she treats those on whom earthly juridical institutions will pass judgment. Although
he is writing about forgiveness of enemies rather than civil justice, Miroslav Volf draws

64. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, "The Radical Reformation and the Jurisprudence of Forgiveness"
in McConnell, Cochran and Carmella, ChristianPerspectives on Legal Thought, pp. 321-39.
65. O'Donovan, The Ways of Judgment, p. 84.

66. See Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), p. 260; Catechism of the Catholic Church §2267 (1997).
67. See William S. Brewbaker 1II, "Theory, Identity, Vocation: Three Models of Christian Legal
Scholarship," Seton Hall Law Review 29 (2009), pp. 44-5.
68. Ephesians 4:15.
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on the significance of the Christian's assurance of God's ultimate triumph over injustice
to make a similar point:
Forgiveness flounders because I exclude the enemy from the community of humans even as I
exclude myself from the community of sinners. But no one can be in the presence of the God
of the crucified Messiah for long without overcoming this double exclusion - without
transposing the enemy from the sphere of monstrous inhumanity into the sphere of shared
humanity and herself from the sphere of proud innocence into the sphere of common sinfulness.
When one knows that the torturer will not eternally triumph over the victim, one is free to
rediscover that person's humanity and imitate God's love for him. And when one knows that
God's love is greater than all sin, one is free to see oneself in the light of God's justice and so
rediscover one's own sinfulness. 69
Like God's justice, human justice is a matter of the personal, not merely the mechanical.
The Christian jurist, even as he carries out the law, must do so in a spirit of mercy and
humility, aware of his own limitations, his accountability to God and the immense worth
of those being judged. The stubborn question of how to operationalize these insights still
remains, however. For those who are actually involved in administering the justice system, whether in the civil or criminal courts, the sum total of Christian thought may sound
like an admonition to administer justice with love and mercy, but not to get carried away
with the idea, lest good intentions breed bad consequences. Perhaps, at the end of the day,
not much can be said beyond admonitions against assuming a self-righteous posture that
divides the world into "good people" and "bad people" and against denying the evils that
may have brought the offender before the judge - whether those evils be actions of the
accused, those charged with making and enforcing the law, or of the larger community.
Even these small admonitions may be welcome in the context of a political discourse
that vacillates, in its attitude toward the accused, between indifference and paternalism,
and between adopting either an assumption of the individual's unqualified autonomy or
her utter lack of agency. Nevertheless, even on Williams' account, there may be more yet
to be said. When Williams claims that "all that can be said by the Christian about justice
rests upon a doctrine of God," we need not hear him as saying that all the Christian has
to say about justice may be deduced from a theological doctrine. As a theologian and
pastor, perhaps all that Williams can say from his vantage point must necessarily be so
limited. The lawyers and judges to whom he was speaking, however, stand in a different
position. They presumably know more about laws and legal institutions and, in some
respects, offenders, than Williams does. "Resting" on the same theological foundation,
70
they may, with time and effort, be able to say more.

-

69. Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), p. 124.
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